Results: Among dual eligibles and non-dual eligibles, the average number of diseases and case mix scores are higher for LTC users. Adjusting for case mix virtually eliminates the difference for medical costs, but not for LTC expenditures. Adjusting for LTC status reduces the difference in LTC costs, but increases the difference in medical costs.
Individuals eligible and enrolled simultaneously for Medicare and Medicaid-commonly referred to as "dual eligible" or "duals"-have often been cited as accounting for a disproportionate share of Medicare and Medicaid spending compared with non-dual eligible beneficiaries. In the Medicare program, dual eligible beneficiaries account for 16 percent of enrollees, but about 25 percent of expenditures. In Medicaid, they account for 18 percent of enrollees, but about 46 percent of expenditures (Jacobson, Neuman, & Damico, 2012; MedPAC, 2010) . Despite important policy implications presented by duals, published information on this population is sparse. (Coughlin, Waidmann, & Phadera, 2012) . They include persons with developmental disabilities, young adults with acquireddisability,andolderpersons.Ouranalysis focuses on the latter group. Some older people are eligible for Medicaid by virtue of poverty, but many spend down to become Medicaid eligible as a result of long-term care (LTC) costs. The latter Medicare-Medicaid enrollees are frailer and their case mix tends to be more severe than those of other Medicare-Medicaid enrollees (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2011). These Medicare-Medicaid enrollees also have more chronic conditions resulting in higher medical care costs. Among Medicare-Medicaid enrollees who use longterm care, those in nursing facilities are frailer and sicker than those living in the community. However, little attention has been given to the role of long-term care setting and case-mix in Medicare-Medicaid enrollees' medical and LTC costs.
Me d i c a r e -Me d i c a i d e n r o l l e e s a r e a heterogeneous group
Higher rates of health care spending among Medicare-Medicaid enrollees have been documented (Dreyfus & Davidson, 2012; Jacobson, Neuman, & Damico, 2010 ; Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2011 Uninsured, , 2012 Kane, Homyak, Parashuram, Lee, & Woodhouse, 2008; Kasper, Watts, & Lyons, 2010; Young, Garfield, Musumeci, Clemens-Cope, Lawton, 2012) . However, the data are mainly descriptive and do not account for the role of casemix or other characteristics. One explanation for disproportionate costs is that double program coverage results in overlaps and inefficiencies, leading to proposed solutions such as integrated care (Gold, Jacobson, & Garfield, 2012; Meyer, 2012; Neuman, Lyons, Rentas, & Rowland, 2012) . There is a clear need to identify the specific characteristics of Medicare-Medicaid enrollees that account for their disproportionately high expenditures for medical and long-term care.
The only study to examine the effect of casemix on Medicare-Medicaid enrollees' higher LTC costs found that they were largely attributable to greater levels of dysfunction and disease burden (Liu, Long, & Aragon, 1998) . Our study builds upon this work with more recent data and a separate examination of the role of LTC care setting and case mix for elderly MedicaidMedicare beneficiaries. We analyzed Medicare and Medicaid data to examine how type of long-term care and case mix affect expenditures towards medical care and LTC for older MedicareMedicaid enrollees and non-duals, and how these expenditures vary between programs and settings. In response to the findings of Bubolz, Emerson, and Skinner (2012) , we also looked for evidence of de facto cross-subsidization among those covered by both Medicare and Medicaid; namely, was nursing home use (covered only by Medicaid) associated with lower medical care use (covered by Medicare)?
Methods

Study Population
Our study population consists of individuals aged 65 years and older in 2005, enrolled in (1) Medicaid only, (2) Medicare only, and (3) Medicare and Medicaid simultaneously. We selected residents from seven states (Arkansas, Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, Texas, Vermont, and Washington) who illustrate diverse management techniques across the target populations, and diverse state characteristics; e.g., demographics, size, geography, structure of county government, and policies. The LTC waiver, state plan programs, and plan variations are summarized in Appendix Exhibit A1. All of the states had an aging and disability waiver.
In order to analyze the characteristics and expenditures of duals and non-dual beneficiaries based on LTC utilization, we classified our study sample into four groups based on program enrollment and LTC use: We present results for these groups separately based on dual and non-dual program enrollment status.
In order to analyze expenditures for each of these LTC groups at the beneficiary year level, we excluded individuals who belonged to more than one of these LTC groups during 2005 (117,200 out of 1,230,567, or 9.5 percent of our total sample). We excluded individuals identified as having end stage renal disease (ESRD). Although they represent a small portion of the population, their high utilization of services could skew the results. Our analysis was also limited to enrollees in fee-for service (FFS) Medicaid and Medicare. Managedcare clients accounted for substantial numbers of HCBS clients in Minnesota, Texas, and Florida, but few nursing home residents.
Data Sources
The data were derived from a project contracted by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to examine the factors associated with successful efforts to "rebalance" LTC financing in order to increase options for HCBS. Sources included Medicaid Analytic eXract (MAX) and Medicare administrative and claims records for 2005.
In addition, each state provided "finder files" identifying all individuals enrolled in a physically disabled/aged Medicaid HCBS waiver or who used LTC services under a state plan in 2005. We linked these "finder files" to CMS Medicaid and Medicare claims data. We used data on all elderly Medicaid recipients in each state for this analysis.
We 
Regression Models
We conducted a series of regression analyses to assess the effect of dual eligibility on expenditures. The following three dependent variables were used for the regressions: (1) total medical care expenditures per beneficiary year, (2) total LTC expenditures per beneficiary year, and (3) total expenditures (the sum of medical care and LTC) per beneficiary year. We ran fourregressionmodelswitheachdependentvariable. The first model adjusted for state, gender, race, age, urbanity, and dual eligibility status. The second model included all of the independent variables from the first model, in addition to the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS) case mix score for dual and non-dual Medicaid enrollees, and a calculated CDPS-Medicare case mix score for Medicare Only enrollees. The CDPS is a diagnostic classification system that Medicaid programs use to make health-based capitated payments for TANF and disabled Medicaid beneficiaries (Kronick, Gilmer, Dreyfus, & Lee, 2000 Because many beneficiaries (>20 percent) had no expenditures for each of these dependent variables, we used a two-part model for predicting expenditures. First, we ran logistic regressions to predict the probability of a person having any of the three types of expenditures during the year. For individuals with any expenditure, we used Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) to obtain their predicted expenditures; we used a gamma distribution with a log link, because of the skewed pattern of expenditures. We used GEE to account for the correlation between observations within LTC groups and states. Finally, we calculated the predicted expenditures for the whole study sample using the predicted probability of having an expenditure and the predicted expenditure for individuals with a positive expenditure. We performed all analyses using SAS Version 9.2.
Because the dependent variables are defined as log expenditures, which cannot be intuitively interpreted in dollar units, we calculated the predicted mean beneficiary year expenditure for the categorical variables and report these results. The predicted mean beneficiary year expenditure gives the average expenditure for a beneficiary year for each categorical group, while the other predictor variables are fixed at their mean values.
Results
Exhibit 1 shows the characteristics of our sample across the seven states. Medicare-Medicaid enrollees were on average older and more likely to be female, White, and live in rural areas. Medicareonly enrollees. They had a higher average Medicaid LTC users were more likely to be eligible number of diseases from the following diagnostic for Medicaid due to medical necessity or age/ categories: cardiovascular, cancer, cerebrovascular, disability, while Medicare-Medicaid non-LTC dementia, developmental disability, diabetes, users were more likely to be eligible for Medicaid gastrointestinal, infectious disease, metabolic, due to spend down than the corresponding nervous system, psychiatric, pulmonary, renal, Medicaid only enrollees. Medicare-Medicaid skeletal and connective, and skin. Their average enrollees were more likely to be originally eligible Chronic Disease and Disability Payment System for Medicare due to disability than Medicare (CDPS) case mix score was higher.
Amongbothdualsandnon-duals,enrolleesinan LTC group had a higher average number of diseases and case mix scores than enrollees not in an LTC group. Conversely, for each LTC group, MedicareMedicaid enrollees had higher numbers of diseases and case mix scores than non-duals. However, the case mix measures for non-duals in an LTC group were higher than for Medicare-Medicaid enrollees not in an LTC group. The Medicare-only group was consistently lower than the other groups.
Exhibit 2 shows the Medicaid and Medicare medical and LTC beneficiary-year expenditures. Across the seven states, Medicare-Medicaid enrollees and non-duals in LTC groups had higher total expenditures than enrollees not in an LTC group. Medicare-Medicaid enrollees not in an LTC group had lower total expenditures than non-duals in the community and institutional LTC groups. Among the Medicare-Medicaid enrollees, the total medical expenditures were lower for those in institutions than those receiving LTC in the community, although the total expenditures were roughlycomparable.Bydefinition,allexpenditures for the non-LTC groups were towards medical care. Medical care expenditures were much higher for Medicare-Medicaid enrollees compared to non-duals in corresponding LTC groups. By contrast, total LTC expenditures were higher for non-duals. The Medicare-only beneficiaries had dramatically lower Medicare expenditures than duals in all LTC groups.
Exhibit 3 shows the results from a series of regressions designed to examine the relationship between dual status and three dependent variables: medical care expenditure, LTC expenditure, and the sum of these, after adjusting for different baseline characteristics. The results are expressed here as the difference in the marginal means; i.e., the average size of the effect of being a included all variables from model 1, in addition to the beneficiary's case mix score. In model 3, we included the variables from model 1 and the beneficiary's LTC status. The fourth regression adjusted for all of the variables. Medicare-Medicaid enrollee status is consistently associated with higher medical care and total expenditures even after the adjustments. Being non-dual was associated with higher long-term care expenditures after adjustment for case mix and/or LTC group. The size of the estimate (the standardized coefficient) and the corresponding difference in the mean marginal cost are generally reduced as more adjustments are made, but the patterns differ somewhat across dependent variables. Adjusting for case mix lowers the difference for medical expenditures and increases the difference for LTC expenditures between dual and non-dual enrollees. However, adjusting for LTC increases the difference in both medical expenditures and LTC expenditures. The effect of case mix adjustment on expenditures is attenuated after adjusting for LTC status. (Bubolz, Emerson, & Skinner, 2012) , we note the opposite effect. Our findings suggest that nursing homes may be subsidizing Medicare by reducing hospital use and lowering medical expenditures. The difference is not likely due to case mix, which is higher in nursing homes than in community LTC. The mechanism for the savings is not clear. Presumably some cases are treated in the nursing home that would otherwise have been sent to a hospital. This difference in management may reflect better medical (or nursing) care or it may result from a different belief about the value of hospital care for nursing home residents.
Our findings have policy implications. Although the case mix effects of Medicare-Medicaid enrollees has been noted for some time (Liu et al., 1998) , it remains a persistent policy challenge. Because the higher expenditures of duals come from distinct factors, no single solution will fully address them. Some Medicare-Medicaid enrollees would likely benefit from more intensive chronic disease management (Kane, Priester, & Totten, 2005) , while those receiving LTC need both more efficient care and better coordination between LTC and medical care. Some view managed care as a solution, but its public savings depend on how well the rates are set (Gross, Temkin-Greener, Kunitz, & Mukamel, 2004; Kane, Homyak, Bershadsky, & Flood, 2006; Kane, Homyak, Bershadsky, Flood, & Zhang, 2004; Kane, Weiner, Homyak, & Bershadsky, 2001 ). The basic rate setting for Medicare Advantage uses nursing home residence as a risk factor, but for Medicare-Medicaid enrollees this effect may be exaggerated. The basis for the difference in medical care use for LTC recipients in the community and in nursing homes deserves careful attention. If nursing homes are cross-subsidizing Medicare, a combined capitation rate may address this by allowing the managed care entity to decide how to address this subsidy.
The results of these analyses imply that efforts to address cost controls in duals should recognize the importance of targeting LTC users and improving the coordination of medical care and LTC. Finding effective ways to address chronic illness has proven challenging (Boult et al., 2011; Kane, 2009) .
LTC has been recognized as a cost driver (or as an indicator of individuals with high Medicare expenditures). Nursing home residents account for a disproportionate amount of Medicare expenditures, linked to heavy hospital use (Jacobson et al., 2010) . This offers a tempting target for efforts to reduce that utilization. Some enthusiasm has been generated about the potential for introducing better primary care for nursing home residents and thereby saving money for Medicare (Grabowski, O'Malley, & Barhydt, 2007; Ouslander et al., 2010; Saliba et al., 2000; Sylvia et al., 2008) , but so far few such efforts have been effective (Peikes, Chen, Schore, & Brown, 2009 ). One successful model was developed by Evercare, a Medicare Advantage institutional Special Needs Program; it used aggressive care from nurse practitioners to treat nursing home residents in the nursing home and paid the nursing homes for agreeing to retain such patients (Kane, Keckhafer, Flood, Bershadsky, & Siadaty, 2003) .
Our study has several limitations. It reflects the findings from only seven states and cannot be automatically extrapolated to the entire country. Managed care enrollees are excluded. In Minnesota, a large proportion of elderly Medicare-Medicaid eligible people are enrolled in Minnesota Senior HealthOptions(MSHO),aspecialprogramforduals. Other states also enroll beneficiaries in managed care programs, such as the Nursing Home Diversion program in Florida and the STAR Plus program in Texas. We have no data on the composition of the managed care enrollees in relation to those in feefor-service. Although we did adjust for state effects, we could not adjust for small area variations and local market effects (Fisher et al., 2003a (Fisher et al., , 2003b .
Nonetheless, this study highlights important issues that must be confronted by programs that address Medicare-Medicaid enrollees. We need programs to integrate medical and long-term care; managed care may offer one vehicle to accomplish this goal. As more states turn to managed care as a way to deal with this group of disproportionately high users, we will need careful attention to informed rate setting. 
